philosophical principles, whose conflict can only be resolved (that is to say, revealed as merely apparent) through the resources of the transcendental laws governing the respective Critique's domain. 10 Kant calls such an unavoidable yet transcendentally resolvable conflict an Antinomy.
The antinomical conflict, which the transcendental resources of the third Critique are to help resolve in the Dialectic of the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, is a conflict between two maxims concerning causal mechanism. The first of these maxims proclaims causal mechanism's unlimited explanatory sway, the second seeks to limit it. Three elements of this Antinomy, in particular, require our attention: first, Kant's notion of mechanism; second, the circumstance that the Antinomy is a conflict between maxims; third, the fact that the Antinomy concerns the explanatory sway not of 'mechanistic laws' but of 'merely mechanistic laws.'
The fact that Kant frequently invokes causal mechanism in the third Critique (a topic mostly absent from the Critique of Pure Reason) reflects his recognition-first In order to understand the nature of Kant's interest in organisms, the next important thing to note is that the Antinomy is a conflict between maxims (i.e., between merely subjective principles of action). Unlike other such conflicts in Kant's oeuvre, this one is, then, not a conflict between competing metaphysical visions of an ultimate reality. The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that there is a potential slide-in Kant's 'merely'-from the laudatory to the derogatory. 18 And it is only a mild exaggeration to say that everything in Kant's Teleology hangs on which rhetorical posture we see him adopt here. The slide in question is one from an emphasis on essentiality to an emphasis on triviality. It is the sort of shift in perspective that would greet us if we awoke to a world in which Kant's "Critique of Mere Reason" was a classic of Western philosophy. Thus, the answer to our question ('what is being denied by the second maxim's denial of an explanatory strategy based on merely mechanistic laws?') rides on 16 Once a phenomenon is confirmed as a genuinely non-mechanistic phenomenon, a mechanistic explanation of it is then, ipso facto, impossible. 17 This is indeed the direction in which McLaughlin takes things, when he argues that a form of causality that is not mechanistic but that, nevertheless, is governed by the (metaphysical) causal principle is both ontologically and experientially possible. Since that is, however, exactly what would be said, had Kant intended the 'merely' as a swipe at mechanistic laws (or omitted it altogether), it follows (given the dialectic of 'merely' discussed in Part I), that Kant must be using 'merely' in the applauding sense discussed.
Anticipating just the sort of reading that has now, despite his best efforts, become exegetical orthodoxy, Kant thus explicitly seeks to forestall interpretations according to which his second maxim advocates the possibility of objects that cannot be judged mechanistically. Kant could not be more clear: even if we reflect on certain "forms of nature" teleologically, "reflection in accordance with the first maxim is not thereby suspended" (KU, AA 05: 388, my emphasis). To be sure, Kant does go on to say that one can press mechanistic explanations only "as far as one can" (ibid.). But, since teleological reflection does not entail the suspension of mechanistic reflection, an inability to press mechanistic explanations further can only mark the sort of contingent inexplicability that any investigation of natural phenomena is sooner or later bound to encounter. It cannot mark the phenomenon at hand as of the genuinely non-mechanistic sort that would make a mechanistic explanation of it impossible.
What does this mean for the nature of the antinomical conflict in the Teleology?
Just this: if Kant's second maxim does not deny the possibility of a mechanistic explanation of objects whose judging nonetheless also "requires an entirely different law of causality," then the second maxim is simply not in conflict with the requirement that
